consciousness, yet again

I think in the opening bit where he talks about Hofstadter claiming that "some integers are conscious" he's placing a bar upon consciousness, and thus, perhaps, dismissing the discriminatory affordances (being systematic) of math symbols as having a way of dividing the things they touch or approach them and thus conduct some element of computation as a result. Now, that 'touch or approach them' quip leans heavy on analogues of movement, space, and refraction (in my mind), but if we take how we use our symbolic vocabulary seriously, that's perhaps what gives them use value to begin with—being analogues to sensory experience and the systematic nature we see in that. What this unravels isn't much other than the consistency of the interface, and Godel's argument shows that computation is bounded, and more seriously it cannot prove itself with consistency. That's where Penrose leaves space for consciousness, which is above and beyond mere integral or mathematical systems, but we are finding that much of the world around us, including the cells that make us do simple discriminatory computation and future-oriented planning all the time, something that can happen in the merest of molecules and the chemical interactions they afford And here's the rub for me, electromagnetics is the domain and coding space of consciousness. Regardless of if that emergent/transcendent entity, which emerges from so many coordinated, goal-oriented cells, is merely a space for something even bigger to find purchase is for the pantheistic argument, nevertheless, the complexity of cellular architecture, its attendant systematic set of chemistry, and the achievement of orchestrated, conformal electromagnetics is the stuff of what makes the conscious entities, which emerge in this world.